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CASE COMMENT
Section 1912 of the Export-Import Bank Act and
the Bombardier Subway Car Case
by Michael Scott*
I. INTRODUCTION
0n July 13, 1982, the Treasury Department ruled that non-competi-
tive financing was not likely to be a determining factor in the award
of the New York City Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) subway car
contract to Bombardier of Canada.1 The ruling was made pursuant to sec-
tion 1912 of the Export-Import Bank Act.2 This note will analyze the de-
cision, examine the background of section 1912 and review the history
and purpose of the International Arrangement on Officially Supported
Export Credits (Arrangement).3 In addition, the heavy criticism the deci-
sion fostered and the subsidized export finance proposals will be ana-
lyzed. This note will (1) aid attorneys who wish to avail themselves of
section 1912, and, (2) help decrease the "attractiveness" of proposed pro-
tectionist countermeasures.
II. FACTS
On May 18, 1982, the MTA ordered 825 subway cars from the Bom-
* J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law (1984).
1 DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, DECISION OF THE SECRETARY PURSUANT TO SECTION 1912 OF
THE ExPORT-ImuoRT BANK ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1978 7-9 (July 12, 1982), reprinted in DEP'T
OF THE TREASURY, DECISION OF THE SECRETARY, FINANCING OF SUBWAY CARS FOR THE MLETRO-
POLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK (July 13, 1982) [hereinafter cited as SEC-
TION 1912 DECISION].
2 12 U.S.C. § 635 (1982).
Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits (Draft Text), Feb.
22, 1978, reprinted in DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TREASURY NEWS (Feb. 22, 1978) [hereinafter
cited as Arrangement].
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bardier Corporation of Canada. 4 Bombardier had a license to produce
these cars from Kawasaki Heavy Industries of Japan.5 The MTA had pre-
viously ordered 325 cars from Kawasaki with financing terms of 8.5% in-
terest and the principal paid back over a five-year period.6 The Bombar-
dier contract was contingent upon receiving financing from Canada's
official export finance entity, the Export Development Corporation
(EDC). The EDC finance package offered 9.7% interest with the principal
to be paid back over fifteen years, covering 85% of the contract value.'
The MTA put up 15% of the contract value before delivery and the EDC
advanced Bombardier the balance.' At that time, the prime rate in the
United States was 16.5%.1 Although the cars were to be assembled in
Vermont, the Bombardier contract promised 16% New York content.10
One day before, the Treasury had received a telex from the Budd
Company11 requesting an investigation of Bombardier's financing and the
implementation of section 1912 of the Export-Import Bank Act.12 This
was the first time that this section was used. Under section 1912, if the
Secretary of Treasury finds that foreign non-competitive financing 3 is be-
ing offered as part of a foreign sale to the United States, he is empowered
to authorize matching funding from the Export-Import Bank of the
United States 4 to counter the official subsidized financing. 5
On June 8, the MTA was ordered to show cause why an injunction
should not be granted to stop them from awarding the contract to Bom-
bardier."6 Thereafter, a stipulation was entered into between Budd, Bom-
bardier and the MTA whereby the contract would not be submitted to
4 N.Y. Times, May 19, 1982, at 16.
5 Id.
6Id.
7Id.
8 Id.
9Id.
10 "Content" refers to the percentage of work on the car to be done in a given munici-
pality, which in this case was New. York State.
" The Budd Co., located in Troy, Michigan, is the sole producer of railway passenger
cars in the United States. The other major producers of railway passenger cars-Pullman,
St. Louis Car, G.E., Rohr, ard Boeing-have all fallen by the wayside. Letter from Dudley
A. Ward, Vice Chairman, Budd Co., to Donald T. Regan, Secretary of the Treasury (May
20, 1982).
12 Letter from John P. Doane, Treasurer, Budd Co., to John Lange, Director, Office of
Trade Finance, U.S. Treasury (May 20, 1982).
13 12 U.S.C. § 635(a)(1) (1982).
14 The Export-Import Bank is the official export finance entity in the United States.
See generally infra notes 20-29 and accompanying text.
10 12 U.S.C. § 635(a)(3) (1982).
'6 Budd Co. v. MTA, No. 82 CIV. 3744 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 1982) (Order to show cause
why a preliminary injunction should not issue).
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the New York State Public Authorities Control Board 17 for approval until
a decision was reached on the section 1912 action. MTA could also cancel
under the stipulation on or before July 15 if matching funding was to be
awarded."8
Ill. SEcTMON 1912: HISTORY AND PURPOSE
The language of the Export-Import Bank Act' shows that the Ex-
port-Import Bank (EXIM) is to aid overseas objectives. The MTA case
was unique in that a domestic industry was asking EXIM for help with
an entirely domestic project.
Section 1912 was enacted, in part, to meet the challenge of subsidized
export financing. Section 1912 relief was made possible by Congress' 1978
amendments to the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945.' ° Section 635a-l(a)
17 The Control Board must approve any contract proposed by the New York MTA pur-
suant to the Pun. AuT. LAW § 1209(3)(c) (as amended by 1.1981 ch. 1039).
18 SECTION 1912 DECISION, supra note 1, at 4.
" 12 U.S.C. § 635(a) (1982). Section 635(a) provides that: "The objects and purposes of
the bank shall be to aid in financing and to facilitate exports and imports and the exchange
of commodities between the United States or any of its Territories or insular possessions
and any foreign country or the agencies or nationals thereof."
o Export-Import Bank Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 1912, 92 Stat.
3725, 3726 (1978) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 635a-3 (1982)). This section provides:
(a) (1) Upon receipt of information that foreign sales to the United States are
being offered involving foreign official export credits which exceed limits under
existing standstills, minutes, or practices to which the United States and other
major exporting countries have agreed, the Secretary of the Treasury shall imme-
diately conduct an inquiry to determine whether "noncompetitive financing" is
being offered.
(2) If the Secretary determines that such foreign "noncompetitive financing"
is being offered, he shall request the immediate withdrawal of such financing by
the foreign official export credit agency involved.
(3) If the offer is not withdrawn or if there is no immediate response to the
withdrawal request, the Secretary of the Treasury shall notify the country offering
such financing and all parties to the proposed transaction that the Eximbank may
be authorized to provide competing United States sellers with financing to match
that available through the foreign official export financing entity.
(b) The Secretary of the Treasury shall only issue such authorization to the
Bank to provide guarantees, insurance and credits to competing United States
sellers, if he determines that:
(1) the availability of foreign official noncompetitive financing is likely to be a
determining factor in the sale, and
(2) the foreign noncompetitive financing has not been withdrawn on the date
the Bank is authorized to provide competitive financing.
(c) Upon receipt of authorization by the Secretary of the Treasury, the Ex-
port-Import Bank may provide financing to match that offered by the foreign offi-
cial export credit entity- Provided, however, That loans, guarantees and insurance
provided under this authority shall conform to all provisions of the Export-Import
1984
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of the amendments authorizes the President to begin negotiations at the
ministerial level with major trading partners to end predatory export
financing. 21 The result of those negotiations was the International Ar-
rangement on Officially Supported Export Credits (Arrangement).22 The
1978 amendments also authorize EXIM to extend credit at a level com-
petitive with government-supported export instrumentalities of other na-
tions. 23 Section 1912's matching process takes three steps. First, the Trea-
sury must receive information that existing practices, to which the United
States and its trading partners are parties, have been violated by the of-
fering of finance terms below agreed-upon rates and/or exceeding agreed-
upon terms.24 The Treasury will then investigate the possibility of the
financing being non-competitive.25 Second, if the Secretary of the Trea-
sury determines that the financing is non-competitive, he shall request
immediate withdrawal by the foreign official export credit agency.26
Third, if there is a refusal or no response, the Secretary shall notify the
country offering the financing, and all concerned parties, that EXIM may
be authorized to provide competing U.S. sellers with matching financing.
EXIM financing shall only be authorized if the availability of foreign offi-
cial non-competitive financing is likely to be a determining factor in the
award of the contract, provided that the financing is not withdrawn by
the date EXIM receives the Secretary's authorization.2 7
The legislative history of section 1912 is sparse.28 Congress merely
Bank Act of 1945, as amended.
Id.
21 The Secretary of the Treasury, together with the Export-Import Bank and such
other relevant government agencies as the President determines, shall "begin negotiations at
the ministerial level with other major exporting countries to end predatory export financing
programs... including mixed credits, in third country markets as well as within the United
States." 12 U.S.C. § 635a-l(a) (1982).
22 "The Arrangement provides internationally agreed guidelines to cover the export
credit practices of the Export-Import Bank of the United States and similar agencies
abroad. The purposes of these guidelines is to avert wasteful official export credit competi-
tion." DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TREASURY NEWS 1 (Feb. 22, 1978).
23 12 U.S.C. § 635 (1982).
2, Id. § 635a-3(a)(1).
25 "Non-competitive" is defined in 12 U.S.C. § 635a-3(a)(1) as exceeding the limits set
by the Arrangement on Official Supported Export Credits, supra note 3.
26 12 U.S.C. § 635a-3(a)(2) (1982).
27 Id. § 635a-3(a)(3), (b), (c).
18 S. REP. No. 915, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1978). H.R. REP. No. 1115, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 2-4 (1978). The House Report suggests that the purpose of the bill is:
[T]o encourage the sale of more American goods and services overseas by ex-
tending the U.S. Export-Import Bank for 5 years, through September 1983, and
increasing its financing commitment authority from $25 billion to $40 billion ....
U.S. exporters are often at a disadvantage because our major competitors in world
trade, particularly Japan and France, offer more liberal government-backed
Vol. 16:125
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indicated its desire to use EXIM to assist U.S. concerns to be more com-
petitive in the international marketplace.2 9 There are no other guidelines
for implementation to be followed by a prospective petitioner, nor is
there any clarification of key terms for the Secretary.
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ARRANGEMENT AND THE
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) was formed in 1960 for the purposes of "promoting stability and
growth of the member countries and economic development among non-
members."30 The United States, Canada, Japan and the European Eco-
nomic Community are all members of the OECD.31 The relationship be-
tween the OECD and the Arrangement is not one of substance. "The ar-
financing. For example Japan provides official financing services for 48 percent of
its exports, France for 39 percent... and the United States for 10 percent .... In
the interest of fair and free world trade, however, the bill instructs the appropri-
ate officials of our Government to negotiate with other major trading nations on
effective agreements to end the use of unfair or predatory subsidies and financing.
Our goal is to see the nations of the world put aside these devices and allow com-
panies to compete solely on their ability to offer best quality, price and service to
the customer.
29 On the subject of competitiveness, the House Report indicates:
Since the Bank's previous authorization, world economic pressures have led
many of our competitors to implement new export credit practices .... While
programs of export credit support have been expanding abroad, Eximbank has
maintained a very conservative posture with regard to innovations in its own
programs.
It is the opinion of the committee that in the recent past Eximbank has given
too much attention to its mandate to offer market related rates and terms at the
expense of its mandate to provide financing at rates and terms and conditions
competitive with those offered by foreign export credit agencies. The result may
have been a loss of a significant number of export opportunities to U.S. industry
and a loss of U.S. employment.
While the committee remains convinced that this first requirement is of fun-
damental importance, the current adverse U.S. trade balance, combined with the
recent aggressiveness of Eximbank's foreign counterparts require that Eximbank
make a greater effort to meet lower foreign rates and terms when they can be
shown to be a decisive factor in the foreign buyer sourcing decisions.
The committee does not want Eximbank to become an aid bank or to injure
its overall profitability by beginning a program of heavy subsidization of U.S. ex-
ports. Nor does the committee expect Eximbank to meet foreign competition in
every instance. But the committee would like to see Eximbank make a greater
effort to meet competition and to give more weight than that shown in recent
years to this mandate in ranking its priorities.
H. REP. No. 1115, supra note 28, at 7 (emphasis added).
20 H. AuBREY, ATLArc EcONOMC CO-OPERATION 32 (1967).
31 Id.
1984
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rangement is not an OECD action, nor is it an international treaty. The
OECD serves only as the negotiating forum and secretariat." 2
Under the 1978 amendments, the minimum interest to be charged
was set at 11.25% over a maximum of 8.5 years.3 The present arrange-
ment is set out in Figure 1 and features an increase in the minimum in-
terest rates. The present arrangement also re-classifies borrowing coun-
tries so that those with true need may take advantage of the favorable
Schedule III rates. 4
Highlights of the New Arrangement Guideline
Effective July 6, 1982
Classification of
Borrowing Country
I. Relatively Rich
GNP/capita of
$4000 and over
II. Intermediate
All others
Newly graduated
from III to II
Effective
immediately
Effective
1/1/83
III. Relatively Poor
IDA/IBRD-eligible
borrowers
(Post 11/81 Rates)
(Pre Nov. 11/81 Rates)
New Interest Rates (%)
2-5 Years
12.15(11.0)
(8.5)
5-8.5 Years
12.4(11.25)
(8.75)
10.85(10.5) 11.35(11.0)
(8.0) (8.5)
8.5-10 Years
No Credits
No Credits
10.5(10.0) 10.75(10.0) 10.75(10.0)
(7.5) (7.75) (7.75)
10.85
10.0(10.0)
(7.5)
11.35
10.0(10.0)
(7.75)
11.35
10.0(10.0)
(7.75)
The Reagan administration has been wholly supportive of the recent
trends among OECD members to decrease the use and minimize the ef-
fect of predatory export credit subsidies. For example, Treasury Secretary
Donald T. Regan, hailing the European Community's acceptance of the
present Arrangement, stated:
3 Address by Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, Marc E.
Leland before the Salzburg Seminar, Salzburg, Austria (Aug. 9-10, 1982).
33 DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TREASURY NEWS 2 (July 1, 1982).
34 Id. at 1-2.
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At a time when many countries face domestic economic troubles and a
more competitive international trading system, it is especially encourag-
ing that the major exporting countries are able to retain their focus on
the long-term goal of reducing wasteful and trade-distorting export
credit subsidies. We welcome the EC's acceptance of the new Arrange-
ment as a positive step in the international trade area.35
Thus, the U.S. position is that export credit subsidies are trade distor-
tive.s6 The principles of free trade to which the present administration
subscribes cannot tolerate predatory export finance or the effects it
induces.37
There is one other negative effect caused by subsidized export
35 Id.
36 Id.
37Examples of the effects are illustrated in the work of a well-known commentator and
in GATT panel reports:
Legitimate government policies reflecting various value judgments of a particular
society can manifest themselves as benefits or detriments to particular segments
of that society, some of which may be concerned with production of goods. This
can then have an effect on the markets for those goods. An electronics firm in the
United States may have competitive advantage over foreign competitors because
of a range of United States government actions, such as aid to education of scien-
tists, government sponsored research and development, and the stability of busi-
ness and economies of scale that can result from large government-purchase con-
tracts. Yet nobody is proposing that international controls be imposed on all such
policies-although international bodies are now studying these policies. However,
a different view prevails as to the subsidy of a particular good, such as a direct
export subsidy. A system that maintains the domestic price of a product above
worldmarket prices exists in some countries. When exports of products that are
price-maintained area made at prices below those on the same domestic market,
the effect on foreign markets may be the same as a direct subsidy for exports ....
A subsidy may have a "trade diverting" effect rather than a "trade creating" ef-
fect, i.e., may shift sales away from another exporting country rather than increase
the overall amount of the sale .... As tariffs and many quotas have been disman-
tled over the last two decades, subsidies, like other nontariff barriers, have become
increasingly significant and increasingly visible as barriers to the free flow of
trade.
J. JAcKsON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 366 (1969). "The panel considers it fair
to assume that a subsidy which provides an incentive to increase production will, in the
absence of offsetting measures ... either increase exports or reduce imports." GENERAL
AGREEMENT ON TA Fss AND TRADE, BAsic INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DocuMENTs 191 (9th
Supp. 1961). "The substantial removal of quantitative restrictions and the progressive re-
duction of many tariffs have led to an increasing realization of the importance of subsidies
as measures influencing international trade and the fact that they often closely resemble
quantitative restrictions in their purpose and effect." GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND
TRADE, BAsI INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DocuzsENTs 203 (10th Supp. 1962). Export subsi-
dies have the effect of distorting "comparative advantage," the basic economic model which
free trade assumes. For a discussion of comparative advantage, see C. KINDLEBERGER, INTER-
NATIONAL ECONOMICS (5th ed. 1974).
1984
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finance to which even those countries that do not subscribe to free trade
must defer. Government sponsored export credits are a large drain on a
country's national treasury. Two cited offenders are France and Japan.
France derived 18.62% of its 1981 gross national product from merchan-
dise exports.3 8 France spent $3.3 billion (U.S.) on export credit programs
covering 8.5-10 year repayment periods (the maximum allowable under
the Arrangement). 9 Assuming that the cost of funds for a country's offer
is represented by the prevailing government borrowing rate,40 France
spent $280.3 million of goods exported, approximately 25%, in 1981.41 Ja-
pan spent $2.6 billion (U.S.) on export credit programs covering the same
term.42 Again, assuming the cost of funds for a country's offer is repre-
sented by the prevailing government borrowing rate,43 Japan spent $3.2
million per billion in 1981, which is approximately 37%."" These figures
should give an indication of the amount of money committed to such pro-
grams. If allowed to go unchecked, every contract bid upon by more than
one country would result in an increasing spending war with the likely
winner being the bidder with the most "attractive" finance terms rather
than the bid based upon the product's merits. "Although nominal export
credit interest rates have risen every year, the cost of the respective gov-
ernment's borrowings have risen faster, resulting in a pronounced trend
toward greater subsidies in every country. ' 45 Surprisingly, some countries
feel this drain is only a secondary evil and are willing to make the
sacrifice.
46
38 ExPORT-IMPoRT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS ON Ex-
PORT CREDIT COMPETITION AND THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 1 (Dec.
1982).
" The primary examples of export credit assistance are: Inflation Risk Insurance,
which protects exporters against losses resulting from domestic cost increases for projects or
equipment with lengthy fabrication periods; Exchange Risk Insurance, which covers export-
ers against losses which may be incurred when the contract payment is denominated in a
foreign currency and that currency depreciates relative to domestic currency; Mixed Credits,
which combine government foreign aid funds with official export credits to produce conces-
sional financing packages; Local Cost Support, which consists of credit or guarantee support
for costs incurred in the purchasing country that are associated with the export transaction;
and Foreign Currency Loans, which provide funding in foreign currencies for export transac-
tions. Id. at 7.
"' These rates are 7.7% for France and 7.94% for Japan. Japan paid 25% in yen, at an
interest rate of 7.94%; and 75% in U.S. dollars, at a rate of 7.71%. Id. at 4.
41 Id. at 6.
42 Id. at 2.
43 Id. at 3.
4 Id. at 6.
4I Id.
46 Address by Assistant Secretary Marc E. Leland, supra note 32:
Most Participants agree with us that export credit subsidies are wasteful and dis-
tort trade. While most Participants seek to eliminate financing as a factor in ob-
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Under the terms of the Arrangement, an offer of financing which
deviates from the agreed-upon terms and rates is labelled a "deroga-
tion. '4 7 The Arrangement has specific procedures to be followed, and
should a participant wish to derogate, the procedures mandate that notice
is to be provided by the derogating party and an opportunity for consul-
tation with other participants is to be afforded.48 Should consultation
prove futile, other participants may match any non-conforming term or
derogate on their own.
49
The stipulated derogation procedures were utilized by the Canadians
after they received word of the French finance package for their domestic
producer, Francorail. This alleged derogation" by the French resulted in
the requested implementation of section 1912.
V. TREASURY DECISION CALCULUS
The determination of whether or not to match non-competitive
financing is made by the Secretary of the Treasury. Under section 1912,
the first step that the Secretary must take is to determine whether non-
competitive financing is being offered by an official foreign export credit
agency.51 To make such a determination, the Treasury must be informed
of suspected non-competitive financing. In the MTA case, upon receipt of
the May 17 telex, the U.S. missions in Paris and Ottawa began to make
inquiries of the respective governments of France and Canada5 2 to deter-
mine whether non-competitive financing had in fact been offered. Infor-
mation was obtained via responses to these inquiries and additional
telexes from Paris. The information contained in the communications in-
dicated that 825 cars remained to be awarded on the installment contract
for MTA. Another 325 cars were previously ordered from Kawasaki which
was then producing at full capacity.5 3
The French firm's (Francorail) initial bid in late 1981 was financed at
taining export sales, the French have favored subsidizing exports as a way to offset
domestic troubles, such as unemployment. Improvements to the Arrangement
would be much more far-reaching if not for French, and therefore EC, opposition.
47 Arrangement, supra note 3, at 13, para. 9(a)(1).
48 Id. at 13-14, para. 9(a)(1),(4).
,9 Id. at 13, para. 9(a)(2).
50 See infra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
1 12 U.S.C. § 635a-3 (1982).
52 Testimony of R.T. McNamar, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, before the Senate
Committee on Finance 4 (May 28, 1982).
Is FINANCING OF NEW YORK CITY SUBWAY CARS: TREASURY DEPARTMENT INVESTIGATION
UNDER SECTION 1912, ExPORT-IMPORT BANK ACT, reprinted in DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, DE-
CISION OF THE SECRETARY, FINANCING OF SUBWAY CARS FOR THE METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTA-
TION AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK 5 (July 13, 1982) [hereinafter cited as TREASURY
INVESTIGATION].
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8.5% interest with the principal payable over 8.5 years for the first 400
cars. 4 These terms were offered to match the terms that the Japanese
had offered for the first installment." The French were under the mis-
taken impression that the Japanese were viable competitors for the re-
maining portion of the contract. The second 425 cars, under the French
offer, were to be financed at 11% over a five year period.5 6 A combination
of the two installments would result in an effective rate of interest equal-
ing 9.7% .5 Francorail sought a "common-line" (equal rates and terms)
with Canada's EDC for the finance portion of the contract bid. s The
EDC simply never responded to their request.59
On February 2, 1982, the EDC proclaimed that the French offer was
a derogation from the Arrangement. 0 The EDC, therefore, offered a 9.7%
interest rate over an 8.5 year period. The proposed term was later ex-
tended to ten years. This bid was executed pursuant to the Arrangement
derogation procedures. 6 1
Francorail received no response to their common-line proposal and
consequently indicated in their May 12 telex to the MTA that they would
be willing to "match any finance package" the EDC offered 2 Thus, the
final finance packages offered by the French and the Canadians were
identical."s
From the French information, it appears most clearly that it was the
Canadians who first derogated under pressure from the MTA." The un-
cooperative attitude of the EDC can best be explained by the highly com-
petitive nature of the bidding. The EDC's fear that the French offered
more attractive financing to the MTA was unfounded because France
4 Informal Translation of French Telex to U.S. EXIM, June 3, 1982, reprinted in
DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, DECISION OF THE SECRETARY, FINANCING OF SUBWAY CARS FOR THE
METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK, Tab C, at 1 (July 13, 1982) [here-
inafter cited as French Telex].
55 Telex to Metro New York, May 12, 1982, reprinted in DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, DECI-
SION OF THE SECRETARY, FINANCING OF SUBWAY CARS FOR THE METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION
AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK, Tab C (July 13, 1982).
56 Id.
81 Affidavit of Steven M. Polan, Special Counsel to MTA, reprinted in DFm'T OF THE
TREASURY, DECISION OF THE SECRETARY, FINANCING OF SUBWAY CARS FOR THE METROPOLITAN
TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK, Tab E (July 13, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Po-
lan's Affidavit].
"' See French Telex, supra note 54, at 2.
589 Id. The Canadian Officials stated they were "determined that the French [not] be
able to steal this project on the basis of cheap financing." TREASURY INVESTIGATION, supra
note 53, at 5-6.
60 Arrangement, supra note 3, at 13, para. 9(a)(1).
61 Id.
62 TREASURY INVESTIGATION, supra note 53, at 6.
63 Polan's Affidavit, supra note 57, Tab E, at 10.
14 TREASURY INVESTIGATION, supra note 53, at 6.
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knew that Japan was not in the bidding. France then sought a common-
line with Canada so that the MTA award would be based on the merit of
the product and not on the finance package.
As of May 17, 1982, the OECD minimum rate for "rich" countries
was 11.25%, and the maximum term was eight years.6 5 The Treasury thus
found that the Canadian offer of 9.7% for 10 years represented a deroga-
tion from the Arrangement and was therefore non-competitive as defined
in section 1912.66 Therefore, the Treasury held for complainant Budd Co.
under the first step of the matching process.
The second step required under section 1912 is that the United
States must request the withdrawal of the non-competitive financing.67
Beginning in May 1982, the United States made five such requests of the
Canadian government. Concurrent with each such request, notification of
possible matching EXIM financing was given. 8 On each occasion, the re-
ply from Canada was that it could not withdraw without the permission
of the MTA.69
The final step required by section 1912 is that the availability of for-
eign non-competitive financing is likely to be a determining factor in
the award of the contract. The Treasury quickly discerned that the cen-
tral issue in the MTA case would be the proper interpretation of the
phrase "likely to be a determining factor." As already mentioned, nothing
in the legislative history shed light on the intended meaning of this
phrase, and an exhaustive examination of the United States Code like-
wise provides no help with interpretation.7 1 The Treasury, therefore, was
left with the plain-meaning of the statute.7
2
Section 1912 does not require that financing be the determining fac-
tor, but merely a determining factor.73 The Treasury found that what was
required was an "analysis of the purchasing agency's corporate state of
mind. '7 4 However, section 1912 does not require a definitive policy state-
" See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
See Arrangement, supra note 3.
67 12 U.S.C. § 635a-3(a)(2) (1976).
68 SECTION 1912 DECISION, supra note 1, at 6. One such meeting was between Secretary
Regan and Edward C. Lumley, Canada's Minister of State for International Trade. Id.
69 Id.
0' 12 U.S.C. § 635a-3(b)(1) (1982).
71 See supra note 28. Cf. S. REP. No. 844, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), H.R. REP. No.
1115, 95th Cong., 2d Seas. (1978).
72 In Jones v. Liberty Glass, 332 U.S. 524 (1947) the U.S. Supreme Court stated: "In
the absence of some contrary indication, it must be assumed that the framers of [a] statu-
tory provision ... intended to convey the ordinary meaning attached to the language used."
Id. at 532.
73 12 U.S.C. § 635a-3(b)(1) (1982).
7' Memorandum from Peter J. Wallison, General Counsel of Treasury, reprinted in
DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, DECISION OF THE SECRETARY, FINANCING OF SUBWAY CARS FOR THE
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ment regarding the factors which the purchasing agency will take into
account in its contract award. This absence of statutory guidance allows
the Treasury to exercise its own judgment to a great degree."
The Treasury investigation in the MTA case concluded that the fol-
lowing were important and possibly "determining" factors: (1) cost and
availability of financing, (2) price of the cars, (3) delivery schedule (in-
cluding reliability), (4) quality, (5) dependence on a single supplier and
(6) New York content.7 While testifying before the Senate Finance Com-
mittee 7 7 MTA chairman Richard A. Ravitch acknowledged the accuracy
of the Treasury's findings. Ravitch explained that the MTA's five-year
development plan was authorized in 1976 by New York and allowed the
award of subway car contracts by negotiation. He further explained that
the state had established the following statutory criteria for the award:
price, financing, delivery schedule and New York State content.7 8
The facts surrounding the award of the MTA contract show that the
Canadian offer was superior to the American offer for each factor listed
by the Treasury except for the financing. With respect to the financing,
the MTA found that the packages offered were essentially equal. How-
ever, American petitioner Budd-Co. only offered a 17% finance cover as
compared to Bombardier's 85% .
The delivery schedule and the dependence factors also tipped in
Bombardier's favor. MTA had previously awarded Budd Co. a contract
for 130 commuter rail cars for the Long Island Railroad. 0 This contract
contained an option, which Budd Co. did exercise, for an additional 186
cars."' The MTA's management was particularly concerned with the po-
tential negative consequences that would result from putting all of their
METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK, Tab K, at 2 (July 13, 1982).
7 Not only is the Treasury not required to consult the corporate concern, but under
section 1912, the Treasury is the only government agency empowered to make the determi-
nations which authorize EXIM to matching finance.
70 SECTION 1912 DECISION, supra note 1, at 8.
7 Testimony of Richard A. Ravitch, Chairman of Metropolitan Transportation Author-
ity, before the Senate Finance Committee, reprinted in DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, DECISION OF
THE SECRETARY, FINANCING OF SUBWAY CARS FOR THE METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION Au-
THORITY OF NEW YORK, Tab K (July 13, 1982).
78 Id. at 4. Cf. supra note 76 and accompanying text.
11 One interesting irony in this case was that the Budd financing was backed by subsi-
dies from Portugal and Brazil for components produced and exported from those countries.
Thus, two nations who have been among the biggest recipients of development aid were to
subsidize an American purchase of industrial goods. Budd is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
German Tyssen Steel Corporation. Statement of R.T. McNamar, Deputy Secretary of Trea-
sury, before the Senate Committee on Finance 5 (May 28, 1982).
8o SECTION 1912 DECISION, supra note 1 (memorandum regarding MTA-Bombardier
Subway Car Contract Award).
81 Id.
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five-year development plan eggs into one Budd basket; Budd Co. was at
this time operating at full capacity.2
Bombardier had also promised a higher New York State content,
which meant more money and jobs for the state. Bombardier committed
at least $104 million of New York State content while Budd proposed
only $79 million."'
In addition to the Treasury's enumerated factors, Bombardier also
had a licensing agreement with Kawasaki.8 4 Bombardier's car would be
compatible with the car Kawasaki was turning out under the first install-
ment of the 1150 car contract. For the MTA's purpose, similar engineer-
ing would be an advantage.8 5
Ultimately, the MTA considered the Bombardier offer superior on all
counts except price, where the difference in the offers was negligible.8
Despite the importance of financing, it became clear that even if the EDC
was matched by EXIM, there were other considerations (such as the Ka-
wasaki preference and fear of over dependence) which still favored Bom-
bardier's offer. As such, it was impossible for the Secretary to find that
non-competitive financing was likely to be a determining factor in the
award of the contract.
With the third step of the section 1912 requirements unfulfilled, the
Secretary of the Treasury had no authorization to order EXIM to match
the EDC's financing. He did not order such matching and the MTA,
therefore, awarded the contract to Bombardier.8 7
VI. REACTION TO THE DECISION
A. Budd Company
The first reaction to the MTA decision came from the Budd Co. It
attacked the Treasury decision on two grounds: (1) the Treasury was not
competent to judge the technical standards involved with the award of a
82 The second irony in this case was that with production commencing on the initial
130 car contract, Budd's Red Lion, Pennsylvania plant was operating at capacity. Thus,
Budd was attempting to win a contract where assembly was to take place at their Hornell,
N.Y. plant which was not yet constructed. Additionally the work would have been done by
workers who had not yet been trained. Id. The New York Times also reported that Budd
was experiencing production difficulties which would result in a five month delay in delivery
of the Long Island Railroad cars to the MTA. N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1982, at 1, col. 1.
83 See Polan's Affadavit, supra note 57, Tab E, at 10 where Polan states: "Since the
[financing] of Bombardier and Francorail were essentially equal, the tie-breaker was the
amount of New York State content in the contract. Bombardier had the highest New York
State content of all three competitors and its offer therefore was recommended."
4 See N.Y. Times, supra note 4.
8' The benefits of car compatibility are ease of maintenance and part inventory.
88 TREASURY INVESTIGATON, supra note 53, at 16.
87 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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subway car contract; and, (2) the June 10, 1982, stipulation " required
that the financing be a determining factor. The basis for Budd's second
ground was that the MTA had stated it would reopen negotiations should
the Treasury decide the section 1912 issue in Budd's favor.89
The Treasury's position regarding Budd Co.'s reaction revolved
around two main points. First, the Treasury's factual findings did not di-
rectly address the quality of Budd products, and furthermore, their find-
ings were supported by the testimony of Chairman Ravitch and Special
Counsel Polan.9 Secondly, the June 10 stipulation was not an admission
by MTA that non-competitive financing was likely to be a determining
factor. Again, negotiations were only to reopen if the Treasury decided
the section 1912 issue in Budd's favor, which it did not do. 1
On June 3, 1982, Budd filed a countervailing duty complaint regard-
ing the EDC financing with the U.S. International Trade Commission and
the U.S. Department of Commerce.9 2 A countervailing duty is levied in
the amount of a subsidy to offset the unfair advantage provided to the
imported products.93 Under U.S. law and international agreement, the
amount of the countervailing duty is not to exceed the amount of the
subsidy.9 Additionally, the AFL-CIO filed a section 30111 action with the
U.S. Trade Representative (USTR).9 The purpose of section 301 is to
unilaterally respond to a foreign country's unfair trade practice in cases
See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
" Letter from James H. McNeal Jr., Chief Executive Officer, Budd Co., to Donald T.
Regan, Secretary of the Treasury (July 16, 1982).
See infra notes 77 and 83 and accompanying texts.
9' Under section 1912, the presence of a subsidy alone does not allow for matching
financing. Export-Import Bank Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 1912, 92
Stat. 3725 (1978). In this case, matching financing would not have changed the outcome.
"2 Before the U.S. Dep't of Commerce and the U.S. Int'l Trade Commission, Petition
for the Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Imports of Unfinished Stainless Steel Sub-
way Cars, Shells, Parts, and Components Thereof, from Canada, Docket No. 841 (June 3,
1982).
93 J. JACKSON, supra note 37, at 402.
I" See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature, Oct. 30, 1947,
art. VI(3), 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187. See also General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade: Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIH, Apr. 12,
1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619 [hereinafter cited as Subsidies Code]. Cf. 19 U.S.C. §
1671(a) (1982). The Subsidies Code is an international agreement governing the use of sub-
sidies and measures used to offset those subsidies. Subsidies Code, supra.
" Trade Reform Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1982).
" Petition Filed With the United States Trade Representative Under § 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974, As Amended, In the Matter of Subsidized Export Credit to Canadian
Firm Manufacturing Subway Cars. The petition was filed by the Industrial Union Depart-
ment, AFL-CIO on behalf of themselves as well as for the United Automobile and Aerospace
Workers, the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (Districts 19
& 31) and the United Steelworkers of America. Id.
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where internationally agreed upon dispute-settling mechanisms do not
provide an adequate remedy.9 7 The complaints were filed as supplemen-
tary forms of relief after the request to implement section 1912.
Two issues arise in considering the applicability of the supplemen-
tary relief measures requested by the Budd Co. The first is whether the
United States can avail itself of countervailing duties and/or section 301
in situations where a foreign finance package is in accord with the OECD
Arrangement. The second is whether countervailing duties and/or section
301 are precluded by a finding by the Treasury that non-competitive
financing was not likely to be a determining factor.
The first issue arises because the Subsidies Code illustrative list",
seems to provide an exception to countervailing duty law.99 Donald
deKieffer answered this question definitively, speaking for the USTR in
testimony before the Senate Banking Committee. In that text he stated
that:
Nothing in the OECD Arrangement or the Subsidies Code obliges the
United States to ignore the trade distortion inherent in the subsidy, or to
modify the provisions or application of our countervailing duties statute,
which provides an avenue for affected U.S. parties to seek relief from
subsidy-induced trade injury. Subsidization of official export financ-
ing-whether a subsidization of interest rates or other government-sup-
ported financing concessions-offers an artificial competitive advantage
to foreign manufacturers selling in the United States, which could cause
Section 301 provides for unilateral "enforcement of U.S. rights under any trade
agreement or to respond to any act.., that is inconsistent with provisions of... any trade
agreement or is unjustifiable and burdens... U.S. commerce." 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1982).
"' Subsidies Code, supra note 94, 31 U.S.T. at 547 (Annex(k)) (illustrative list of export
subsidies).
90 Item (k) includes:
The grant by governments (or special institutions controlled by and/or acting
under the authority of governments) of export credits at rates below those which
they actually have to pay for the funds so employed (or would have to pay if they
borrowed on international capital markets in order to obtain funds of the same
maturity and denominated in the same currency as the export credit), or the pay-
ment of them of all or part of the costs incurred by exporters or financial institu-
tions in obtaining credits, insofar as they are used to secure a material advantage
in the field of export credit terms.
Provided, however, that if a signatory is a party to an international undertak-
ing on official export credits to which at least twelve original signatories to the
Agreement are parties as of 1 January 1979 (or a successor undertaking which has
been adopted by those original signatories), or if in practice a signatory applies
the interest rate provisions of the relevant undertaking in export credit practice
which is in conformity with those provisions shall not be considered an export
subsidy prohibited by this Agreement.
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injury to U.S. firms. 100
Thus, USTR not only echoes the Treasury condemnation of export credit
subsidy practices, but supports active combat against them with domestic
countervailing duty machinery.
The second issue arises because of the "material injury" and "causa-
tion" requirements of our countervailing duty law.10 1 Section 701(2)(a) of
the 1979 Trade Agreements Act mandates that before any countervailing
duty can be imposed, it must be shown that the subsidy in question is the
threat or cause of material injury to the complaining party.10 2 If financ-
ing was not a determining factor in the Treasury consideration of section
1912 relief, then Budd Co. could not possibly show injury or prove causa-
tion. However, it must be remembered that the Treasury's decision was
made in the context of how the MTA would perceive the facts.'"3
In applying the altogether different countervailing duty law, a gov-
ernment agency looking at the same facts would use an entirely different
analysis. A section 1912 action is concerned with the effect of a rate of-
fered below the OECD minimum allowable interest rate. A rate that falls
below the OECD minimum may or may not cause material injury. Even if
no injury occurs by reason of a rate falling below the OECD minimum,
injury may still occur because of the amount subsidized between the
OECD minimum and the market rate. Section 1912 does not address any
interest rate above the OECD minimum.
However, this hypothetical construct became obsolete when the U.S.
International Trade Commission announced its preliminary finding of
material injury or threat thereof by reason of imports of components of
rapid transit rail passenger cars.10 4
200 Statement by Donald deKieffer, General Counsel, Office of the United States Trade
Representative, before the Senate Committee on Banking 2 (July 22, 1982). Mr. deKieffer
also indicated U.S. opposition to subsidized export finance:
If we are to realize fully the benefits of open trade, and if the trading system is to
allocate resources efficiently on a global scale, trade flows must reflect natural
competitive advantage and not government manipulation of the conditions of
trade. It is an unfortunate fact that governments still engage in a variety of trade-
distorting practices, designed to undermine the judgment of the marketplace. One
such practice is export subsidies, that inhibit the normal competitive forces in the
international marketplace. Indeed, one of the most difficult and damaging export
subsidy problems facing the United States today is in the area of official export
financing.
Id. Cf. supra note 33 and accompanying text.
101 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (1976).
102 See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
103 See supra notes 93 and 100 and accompanying text.
104 U.S. INT'L TRADE COMMISSION, DETERMINATION OF THE COMMISSION IN INVESTIGATION
No. 701-TA-182 UNDER THE TARIFF ACT OF 1930, CERTAIN RAI. PASSENGER CARS AND PARTS
THEREOF FROM CANADA, USITC Pub. No. 1277 (Aug. 1982) [hereinafter cited as USITC DE-
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B. Congress
The reaction of the Senate Banking Committee was one of outrage.
The Treasury decision was viewed as an affront to American quality."'5
One committee member queried how the private sector was to lead the
United States out of recession when the government that made the plea
was so eager to stab it in the back." 8 The section 1912 action was viewed
by the Senate Banking Committee as the dying gasp of the last American
subway car manufacturer. With elections only three months away, the
hearing quickly turned into a personal attack on the Treasury and Assis-
tant Treasury Secretary Marc E. Leland. 10° More important, however,
T RmNATON]. Mr. deKieffer noted in a hearing which took place after the Treasury's sec-
tion 1912 determination and the award of the contract to Bombardier that the imposition of
countervailing duties in the MTA case may be inappropriate:
Our countervailing duty laws, for that matter, our section 301 statutes, are
designed to deal with situations where there is a stream of commerce and where
American industry can, indeed, benefit by extra duties being imposed on current
imports which offset the value of the subsidy. When you have situations like we
have in the MTA area, all that can be accomplished under our current law is the
imposition of countervailing duties or some sort of retaliation internationally
which can penalize consumers, with no real benefit to domestic industry, because
by that time they have already lost the order.
Statement by Donald deKieffer, General Counsel, Office of the United States Trade Repre-
sentative, before the Subcommittee on International Finance and Monetary Policy of the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 134 (July 22, 1982).
105 See Subsidized Export Financing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International
Finance and Monetary Policy of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Af-
fairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1982) (remarks of Chairman John Heinz) [hereinafter cited
as Hearing on Subsidized Export Financing]. The Chairman stated:
Now, it is frankly difficult for me as a U.S. Senator to believe that an American
executive department or agency did the analysis which accompanied the report.
The benefit of the doubt is consistently given to the Canadian bidder with regard
to technological superiority, quality and reliability of workers, and quality and
reliability of management, even though the Budd Co. has built 11,000 railway cars
of stainless steel over the past 50 years and Bombardier has yet to build a single
one. I thought for a while I was reading a brochure by the Canadian Chamber of
Commerce.
Id.
10o Personal recollection of the author who was present at the hearing.
107 Hearing on Subsidized Export Financing, supra note 105, at 147. Chairman Heinz
stated:
I suggest you do the following go take your report, leave the office, get a drink in
your hand, turn the TV set on, take a sip, get into a comfortable chair and read it,
and then come back and tell me if you think it is in any way prejudicial or hostile
to U.S. business .... Now, I don't know what kind of record Treasury is trying to
build here. It sounds to me that you're trying to justify a Treasury decision after
you've taken it, and I don't think you're cognizant of the damage you're doing
either to the reputation of the last remaining American manufacturer of light rail
vehicles-you are doing a hatchet job on them that Mr. Ravitch would never con-
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were the several protectionist bills introduced as a result of the decision.
The first of the proposed protectionist bills was House Bill 6799.18
This bill sought to amend the current section 1912 by providing for auto-
matic matching funds if financing at a level below the OECD minimum is
not withdrawn upon request. The proposed automatic matching provision
would result in a drain on an already troubled U.S. budget. 09 Under the
proposed bill, the "determining factor" test would also be eliminated. It is
also trade-restrictive in its emphasis on financing rather than on the mer-
its of any given product. This position is contrary to the present adminis-
tration's liberal trade policies.
Two other proposed protectionist bills are Senate Bills 2732 and
2616. Senate Bill 2732110 would reduce financing from a "determining fac-
tor" to only a "relevant" factor in the consideration of a finance package.
This bill would reduce the Treasury's discretion in authorizing EXIM
matching funds, but again presents the problem of monetary drain on the
economy.
Additionally, Senate Bill 2616111 would amend the 1964 Urban Mass
Transportation Act (UMTA) by prohibiting disbursement of federal aid
to any domestic concern which has received benefits under a contract
with a foreign entity where the terms of the contract violate the Subsidies
Code. At the very least, such a provision in UMTA would invite retalia-
tion from U.S. trading partners and would receive condemnation as being
trade-restrictive. 1 2
VII. CONSIDERATIONS FOR USE OF SECTION 1912
As has been previously discussed, the legislative history of section
1912 is sparse.111 However, the procedural steps contained within the sec-
sider doing. Mr. Ravitch is a very shrewd, able, honest, straight man who wants a
good deal, and obviously he knows one when he sees one. But I wish I could say
the same kind of things, favorable things, about the Treasury Department in this
instance. Because not only have you done a hatchet job on an American business
firm, but you are in the process of making kindling out of our basic stance in favor
of free but fair trade.
Id.
108 H.R. 6799, 97th Cong. 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REc. H4361 (daily ed. July 20, 1982).
109 Cf. supra note 46 and accompanying text.
110 S. 2732, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REc. S8255 (daily ed. July 14, 1982).
111 S. 2616, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. Rc. 86595 (daily ed. June 9, 1982).
21 While export credit subsidies are undesirable, the automatic exclusion of what may
be a "superior" product makes no more sense than the award of a contract based on the
presence of subsidized finance. It does not address the "merits" of the product and ignores
comparative advantage. In this respect, section 1912 is adequate in that it addresses the
importance of a subsidized finance package before authorizing retaliation.
I18 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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tion are very clear. Section 1912 requires that a proposed finance package
contain finance terms below those agreed upon under the Arrangement.
11
'
Determining whether to provide matching funds is wholly an exercise of
Treasury discretion.11 5 Therefore, potential petitioners should be en-
couraged to determine the objectives of the purchasing concern prior to
the sale and then make an honest determination as to whether or not
they are in a position to fulfill such objectives.
Consideration of this type would save an offeree embarrassment in
open court or before Congressional committee, if a contract offeror af-
firms the Treasury's negative findings with respect to the offeree's abili-
ties. Thereafter, should section 1912 proceedings be initiated, the
purchasing concern should actively seek substantial communication be-
tween itself and the Treasury to make clear that the section 1912 com-
plainant is capable of filling the purchasing concern's contract require-
ments. In the present case, the section 1912 action took approximately six
weeks from petition to resolution. 6
In addition to the above considerations, it is important to note that
should a petitioner receive a negative determination from the Treasury
on its section 1912 action, other import relief measures will not be pre-
cluded.1 1 7 Section 1912 is compatible with U.S. countervailing duty law1 8
and is also compatible with section 301, subject to executive discretion.,,1
Therefore, these alternative measures should be pursued simultaneously
upon the commencement of section 1912 proceedings.
", Arrangement, supra note 3.
1'8 Supra note 75 and accompanying text.
I' May 20, 1978-July 13, 1978.
117 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
118 Id.
119 The author is of the opinion that nothing will stop a section 301 action should the
White House choose to support one, given the absence of an injury test and the particular
legislative history of section 301. That legislative history in part provides:
Under section 301(b) of the House bill the President would have been required to
consider the relationship of any action taken under section 301 to the interna-
tional obligations of the United States. The Committee on Finance agreed to de-
lete this reference to U.S. international obligations since it felt that retaliation
should be against the countries which discriminate against U.S. commerce and not
against other countries which do not so discriminate. In addition, the Committee
felt that there would be situations, such as in the case of unreasonable foreign
import restrictions where the President ought to be able to act or threaten to act
under section 301, whether or not such action would be entirely consistent with
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
SENATE FINANCE CommrrrEE, REPORT ON H.R. 10710, TRADE REFORM ACT OF 1974, S. REP.
No. 1293, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 166 (1974). However, the author has also been informed that
USTR chose not to proceed with the AFL-CIO complaint because of the Treasury findings
in the section 1912 action. Telephone conversation with C. Michael Hathaway, Deputy Gen-
eral Counsel, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (Jan. 12, 1983).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The Budd Co.'s attempted implementation of section 1912 was the
first case decided under this section by the Treasury. This case resulted
in judgment against a U.S. industry. Section 1912 was supposed to com-
bat officially subsidized export finance. It must also be remdmbered that
this case was only the first attempted implementation of the matching
fund provisions contained in the section. Even if the decision had been in
favor of Budd Co., one would have to question the propriety of EXIM
funding a purely domestic project.120 In the MTA case, the Treasury ap-
pears to have had all necessary information to make a competent deci-
sion. Further, the MTA corroborated the Treasury's findings. More use of
section 1912 is needed before determining whether provisions of 1912
should be amended. Certainly, any amendment cannot be as blatantly
protectionist as those currently proposed if the United States is to con-
tinue to champion principles of liberal trade.
120 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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